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The Cumis Decision-What has it Done to
Insurance Policies?
INTRODUCTION
In December 1984, the California Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals issued a decision which has effectively changed the way Cal-
ifornia insurance companies conduct business. Prior to San Diego
Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society,' an in-
surance company was obligated by the terms of its policy to pro-
vide a defense for its insured when a suit was filed against the
insured alleging injuries covered under the policy. After Cumis,
the insurance company not only must provide a defense, but also
must offer and pay for independent counsel 2 when any potential
conflict of interest between the insurer and its insured exists.3 Ar-
guably, any time an insurer sends its insured a reservation of
rights letter or obtains a nonwaiver agreement from its insured
which allow the insurer to later dispute coverage under the policy,
a conflict of interest exists.4 This is true because, in the court's
view, an insurer will direct the defense of its insured to avoid lia-
1. 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984), reh'g denied.
2. An independent counsel is "pledged to promote and protect the prime interests of
his client." Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799,
809, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 354 (1971).
3. A conflict of interest occurs when representation of one client is made less effec-
tive by representation of another. Spindle v. Chubb Pac. Indem. Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d
706, 713, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776, 780-81 (1979). Whether the court correctly discussed what
constitutes a conflict of interest is a topic outside the scope of this article. For a brief
discussion of the court's misapplication of the ABA Model Code and the applicable Cali-
fornia rule regarding an attorney's conflict of interest, see Filice, The "Cumis" Decision:
Was it Correctly Decided?, VERDICT, Nov. 1985, at 16.
4. The distinction between a nonwaiver agreement and a reservation of rights has
been stated as follows:
"A nonwaiver agreement is a bilateral contract, normally in writing, entered into
by the assured and the insurer after the accident, providing that the insurer will
defend the tort suit while reserving its right to assert nonliability at a later
date. . . .reservation of rights is very similar t6 a nonwaiver agreement, and it is
subject to the same limitations and restrictions. It differs in being less formal than
the nonwaiver and less tied to strict contract principles. The insurer need only
notify, or attempt to notify, the assured that it is conducting the investigation and
defense of the tort claim under a reservation of the right to assert policy defenses
at a later time, and the assured's silence will usually be deemed acquiesence.
Courts have in general been fairly liberal in implying reservations.
(Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1446; fns. omitted.)
Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate, 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267,
272-73 (1976)
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bility on its part without considering the effect on the insured.5
Thus, whenever the insurer believes the insurance contract does
not apply, it is in effect obligated to incur the expense of not one,
but two, lawyers: one to protect both its interests and its insured's
interests, and one to protect its insured's interests alone. Conse-
quently, the Cumis decision will dramatically increase the cost of
insurance.
While Cumis may be welcomed by those who are initially sus-
pect of the insurance industry, the court's decision does violence to
the foundation of insurance. An insurance policy is a contract,
governed by settled contract principles. The district court, how-
ever, failed to address the application of these rules in Cumis.
Rather, the court apparently relied on ethical considerations to
the exclusion of all other rationales in reaching its decision. Set-
ting aside the question of whether an insured needs representation
by two lawyers, an issue remains in the court's decison: The court
failed to justify imposing additional cost on the insurer in the ap-
parent absence of any supporting language in the policy. Since
Cumis is now the law in California, its potential effect on insur-
ance policies should be seriously examined.
This Note first will discuss the Cumis decision itself.6 Next, this
Note will address those contract rules historically used in insur-
ance law.7 Third, it will trace the recent development of the duty
to defend in the context of contract law by pointing out the major
steps taken in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company8 and Executive
Aviation, Inc. v. National Insurance Underwriters.' It then will
contrast the contract principles used in these cases with the rea-
soning which influenced the court in Cumis.10 Finally, this Note
will propose that the better solution to the problem of conflict of
interest is the practice that was in force prior to Cumis.11
I. THE CUMIS CASE
In the case underlying Cumis, a suit was filed against the San
Diego Navy Federal Credit Union by one of its employees alleging
tortious wrongful discharge, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, wrongful interference with contract, inducing
5. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12-28.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 29-63.
8. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 64-85.
9. 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971). See infra text accompanying notes
86-99.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 100-42.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 143-55.
[Vol. 23
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breach of contract, breach of contract and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 12 The credit union tendered defense of this ac-
tion to Cumis, the credit union's insurance company."3 Cumis' as-
sociate counsel reviewed the allegations and believed that, under
the credit union's insurance policy, Cumis was obligated to defend
the action. 4 Accordingly, Cumis hired counsel to defend the
credit union, but informed it that Cumis was reserving the right to
later deny coverage as the complaint alleged willful conduct and
prayed for punitive damages, both of which were not covered by
the policy.' 5 The credit union thereafter hired independent counsel
to protect its interests as to those allegations not covered by the
policy.'" While Cumis initially payed two bills submitted to it by
the independent counsel,' 7 it subsequently refused to pay invoices
believing that there was no existing conflict of interest which
would have required such payment."8
At a settlement conference in the underlying action, Cumis,
without informing the credit union of the conference, authorized
its counsel to make an offer lower than the amount demanded.' 9
Later, but before trial, the credit union sent Cumis a letter ex-
pressing its desire that the underlying suit be settled.20
The credit union and its employees involved in the underlying
suit filed a declaratory relief action to determine whether the costs
12. In the underlying action, Magdaline S. Eisenmann brought suit when the credit
union first suspended and later discharged her in 1980 after $3,530 was found missing from
a vault in a branch where she was manager. The credit union accused her of incompetence
and neglect and contended that the missing money was a result of her failing to follow
procedures included in a revised security manual. A jury found for Mrs. Eisenmann and
awarded her $230,000; $200,000 in compensatory damages, $5,000 for emotional distress
and $25,000 in punitive damages. The judgment was upheld by the California Court of
Appeals for the Fourth District on March 19, 1986 in an unpublished opinion.
13. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The duty to defend
clause in the credit union's policy with Cumis read as follows:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy the company shall: (a)
defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or de-
struction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent; but the company may make such an investigation, negotiation
and settlement of any claims or suit as it deems expedient.
Opening Brief for Appellant at 11, n.2, Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494
[hereinafter Opening Brief].
14. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
15. In fact, Cumis obtained opinions from other law firms which confirmed this opin-
ion. Opening Brief at 8, Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494.
16. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497. During the entire suit,
Cumis had its own attorney defending the credit union.
17. These bills totaled only $300. Opening Brief, supra note 13, at 7.
18. For an explanation of the circumstances in which an insurer would, under Cali-
fornia law, have been obligated to pay for independent counsel prior to Cumis, see infra
text accompanying notes 86-99.
19. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
20. Id. at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
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of their independent counsel should be paid by Cumis. The trial
court ruled that Cumis was obligated to pay for the independent
counsel of the Credit Union and the court of appeals affirmed.2'
Concentrating on the conflict of interest that the court believed
existed between Cumis and the Credit Union, the appellate court
held that one attorney could not ethically represent both parties.22
The court reasoned that the defense of one party might adversely
affect the liability of the other. Specifically, Cumis would desire to
prove that the Credit Union's acts were intentional which would
preclude coverage while the Credit Union would want to prove the
opposite to force Cumis to provide coverage. 23 While acknowledg-
ing that counsel representing both parties owed each a high duty
of care,2' the court in Cumis restated the general rule that "'[i]n
actions in which.., the insurer and insured have conflicting inter-
ests, the insurer may not compel the insured to surrender control
of the litigation.' "25
The court then went one step further: It required the insurer to
pay for the independent counsel of its insured whenever a poten-
tial conflict of interest exists, usually embodied in a reservation of
rights letter as was sent by Cumis. 28 Whereas prior to this deci-
sion, the Gray ruling obligated an insurer to defend virtually all
actions,27 now the insurer is forced to pay for an additional lawyer
in any case in which coverage of the insured may be at issue.28
The court compounded the novelty of this decision by deviating
from the usual reasoning in insurance cases. Therefore, some
background is needed with regard to the historic role of courts vis-
a-vis insurance contracts and how the courts' approach has
changed in recent years.
II. HISTORICAL RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
There can be little argument that insurance policies are con-
tracts.29 The contract is bargained for in that the insured has paid
21. Id. at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
22. Id. at 366, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
23. Id. at 365-66, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
24. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
25. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (quoting Tomerlin v.
Canadian Indemnity Company, 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 571, 577, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731,
737 (1964)).
26. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375-76, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63.
28. This is because the reservation of rights issued in such cases creates the conflict
of interest entitling the insured to payment for additional counsel.
29. Courts both in and out of California have so held for decades. See, e.g., Vyn v.
Northwest Casualty Co., 47 Cal. 2d 89, 301 P.2d 869 (1956); Sullivan v. Union Oil Co. of
Ca., 16 Cal. 2d 229, 105 P.2d 922 (1940); Whitney Estate Co. v. Northern Assurance Co.,
[Vol. 23
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a premium in return for the promise of the insurer to pay the
benefits of the policy if certain conditions are met including the
payment of future premiums. If a coverage dispute arises between
the insurer and the insured, the construction of this contract be-
comes critical in determining whether the insurer must perform.
In making such decisions, courts generally have held that insur-
ance contracts should be interpreted by applying the same rules of
construction used in other construing other contracts.30 In effect,
this means that "[t]he question of construction of a contract of
insurance, as of the contracts generally, can arise only when the
language of the contract is in need of construction. '3 1 Thus, if
clear and unambiguous language is used by the drafter, there is
nothing to be interpreted.32 The court "will indulge in no forced
construction so as to cast a liability upon the insurance company
which it has not assumed."33 In interpreting a clear and unambig-
uous policy, the court looks to the intent of the parties which has
been plainly expressed in the terms of the contract. The court can
thus neither expand nor restrict the coverage in an insurance pol-
icy if the language is clear and unambiguous. 4 Therefore, the
court's threshold inquiry is whether ambiguous language exists. If
there are no ambiguities in the contract, the court's duty is to
155 Cal. 521, 101 P. 911 (1911); Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 111 Cal. 409, 43 P. 1115
(1896); Gillies v. Michigan Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 98 Cal. App. 2d 743, 221 P.2d
272 (1950); McGlothin v. U.S. National Life & Casualty Co., 36 Ga. App. 325, 136 S.E.
535 (1927); Eicks v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 300 Mo. 279, 253 S.W. 1029
(1923); Olendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E.2d 676 (1938); State v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 138 Ohio St. 376, 35 N.E.2d 437 (1941); Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Or. 548, 61
P.2d 423 (1936);
California has codified its courts' decisions: "Insurance is a contract whereby one under-
takes to indemnify another against loss, damages, or liability arising from a contingent or
unknown event." CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1972).
30. Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132, 135-36
(1901), where the United States Supreme Court stated that "the rules established for the
construction of written instruments apply to contracts of insurance equally with other con-
tracts." See also Industrial Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Il1 Cal. 503,
507-08, 44 P. 189, 190 (1896); Financial Indem. Co. v. Murphy, 223 Cal. App. 2d 621,
628, 35 Cal. Rptr. 913, 917 (1963).
31. See generally CAL. CIV. COoE § 1638 (West 1985); Zito v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
36 Cal. App. 3d 277, 111 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973); Fyne v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 138
Cal. App. 2d 467, 292 P.2d 78 (1956); Laventhal v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 9 Cal. App.
275, 98 P. 1075 (1908).
32. In such cases, the court "simply read[s] the clear and controlling language and
hold[s] accordingly." McMillan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 211 Cal. App. 2d 58, 62, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 125, 128 (1962) where the court applied clear and unambiguous exclusionary clauses
to deny coverage after the plaintiff made a claim following an automobile accident.
33. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 38 Cal. 2d 73, 81, 237 P.2d 510, 514
(1951).
34. See American Casualty Co. v. Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1962) where
the court, relying on several prior decisions, specifically stated that "We cannot rewrite the
policy."
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apply the terms of the contract regardless of the potentially harsh
results. 35
In determining whether an insurance policy contains ambiguous
language, a court reads the policy as would a reasonably prudent
person." Stated differently, the policy is considered from the point
of view of a layman who is trained in neither the law nor the
insurance business.37 This seemingly gives the court broad discre-
tion in finding ambiguity as there are no concrete standards to
guide it in its determination. However, the court is restrained by
the broad rule that ambiguity exists in an insurance policy only if
"'there are two or more inconsistent interpretations [of the pol-
icy], both of which are fair and reasonable.' "38 Thus, the court
will only indulge a layman's interpretation of the policy if that
interpretation is reasonable from an objective standard.3 9
A court which finds ambiguities in a policy must strictly con-
strue them against the insurer, as drafter of the policy, and liber-
ally in favor of the insured.40 However, even if ambiguous lan-
35. Combined Communications Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 641 F.2d 743, 745
(9th Cir. 1981). See also Hatch v. Turner, 145 Tex. 17, 21, 193 S.W.2d 668, 669-70
(1946), where the Texas Supreme Court stated "[tihat the conditions may be harsh does
not affect the rule [that the court must apply the plain words of the policy] as no one is
compelled to deal with the insured on the basis of such conditions."; 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insur-
ance § 271 (1972).
36. General Casualty Co. of America v. Azteca Films, Inc., 278 F.2d 161, 167 (9th
Cir, 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960); Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 5
Cal. 3d 112, 115, 485 P.2d 1129, 1130, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514 (1971); Hobson v. Mutual
Benefit Health & Accident Assoc. Inc., 99 Cal. App. 2d 330, 333, 221 P.2d 761, 763(1950).
37. Trousdell v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 55 Cal. App. 2d 74, 81, 130 P.2d
173, 177 (1942).
38. Continental Savings Ass'n v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 762 F.2d
1239, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985), modified, 768 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Entzminger v.
Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 652 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1st Dist.
1983)).
39. R. KEETON. INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a), at 351 (1971).
40. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hunri, 263 U.S. 167, 174 (1923); Russell v. Bankers Life Co.,
46 Cal. App. 3d 405, 412, 120 Cal. Rptr. 627, 631 (1975); see also Continental Casualty
Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437, 296 P.2d 801, 809 (1956), wherein the
California Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is elementary that in insurance law any ambi-
guity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer."
This approach to insurance contracts is logical because the insured rarely has the oppor-
tunity to contribute to the coverage he receives; rather, due to the bargaining relationship
between an insurer and an insured, the conditions under which the insurer's obligations will
arise are predetermined by the insurer. In fact, insurance policies have been found to be
contracts of adhesion.
Health insurance agreements... have been held to be adhesion contracts.... An
adhesion contract is a standardized contract written entirely by a party with supe-
rior bargaining power. The weaker party to an adhesion must "take it or leave it,"
and be without opportunity to bargain .... This particular standardized contract
was prepared entirely by a major insurance company whose bargaining power is
clearly superior to individual members of the general public.
Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 145 Cal. App. 3d 709, 718-19, 193 Cal. Rptr.
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guage is found in an insurance contract, a court is not
unrestrained in its interpretation and application of the policy.
Despite the well-entrenched attitude that a policy should be inter-
preted against the insurance company,41 the court cannot create
ambiguities where none existed, nor will it favor an insured's
strained, and hence unreasonable, reading of the words of the pol-
icy over an insurer's use of the language in its logical sense.42 Fur-
thermore, while courts will recognize ambiguity in an insurance
policy, they will not then apply a forced construction of the in-
sured's interpretation so as to fix liability on an insurer which it
had not previously assumed. 43 The intent of both the insurer and
the insured are thus important when an ambiguous provision is to
be clarified.44 If an insurance policy is indeed a contract of adhe-
sion,45 the provisions of the policy may not express the intent of
one party, the insured. However, this problem regarding intent is
solved in that the policy is to be interpreted "in the light of the
reasonable and normal expectations of the parties as to the extent
632, 636-37 (1983). In addition, the California Supreme Court has indicated that a stan-
dardized life insurance contract sold from a vending machine could be considered one of
adhesion. Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 297-98,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 183 (1962).
Since the insured has so little choice in the drafting of the policy that is designed to
protect him, the insurance company must be prevented from defeating the insured's inter-
ests by writing an uncertain policy. The role by which courts interpret ambiguities in the
policy strictly against the insurer is the most efficient way of protecting the insured as that
rule forces the insurer to use language that is clear and understandable to the insured so
that he can decide if the coverage is adequate for his needs. The rule also prevents the
insurer from using terms of art that may be foreign to the layman but which could affect
the coverage provided to him.
41. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE § 1654 (West 1985); Steven, 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377
P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172; Continental Casualty Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801;
Victoria Steamship Co. v. Western Assurance Co., 167 Cal. 348, 139 P. 807 (1914); Pa-
cific Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, 158 Cal.
367, 111 P. 4 (1910); Admiralty Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 379, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1983); Hays v. Pacific Independent Group, 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 86 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1970); Everett v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 332, 187 P. 996 (1919).
42. See, e.g., Guidici v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 79 Cal. App. 2d 128, 179 P.2d 337
(1947), where the court refused to accept the insured's argument that the definition of "in
charge of," as found in an exclusionary clause, meant possession plus active operation on
item. Instead, the court upheld the insurer's contention that possession was sufficient.
43. Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 804, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1962). See
also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Cal. 2d 318, 323, 419 P.2d
641, 643, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1966); Stewart v. Estate of Bohnert, 101 Cal. App. 3d
978, 985, 162 Cal. Rptr. 126, 129 (1980); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Flynt, 17 Cal. App. 3d 538, 546-47, 95 Cal. Rptr. 296, 301 (1971).
44. An ambiguity does not necessarily mean that the intent of the parties is not clear
as, for example, despite unclear language, the court will look to the other clauses of the
policy to determine the intent of the parties to resolve the uncertainty of the disputed
clause. Burr v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 568, 575, 296 P. 273, 276 (1931)
(quoting Jones v. Van Nuys, 161 Cal. 158, 165, 118 P. 541, 544 (1911) and In re Estate of
Winslow, 121 Cal. 92, 94, 53 P. 362, 364 (1898)).
45. See supra note 40.
1986]
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of coverage. "48 Again, this reinforces the proposition that despite
the strong policy favoring an insured, a court cannot construe an
insurance policy in a way which would confer unbargained for
benefits on an insured at the expense of an insurer or which would
violate the reasonable expectations of both parties.47
III. THE PRE-GRAY DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND
Courts traditionally have applied accepted contract principles in
which the insurance company's duty to defend its insured has
been at issue.4 8 Originally, courts examined the duty to defend
clause in the policy and applied it to the allegations contained in
the complaint against the insured.49 A typical duty to defend
clause binds the insurance company to:
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the INSURED shall
become legally obligated to pay as DAMAGES because of C.
BODILY INJURY or D. PROPERTY DAMAGE to which
this insurance applies, caused by an OCCURRENCE ... and
the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit
against the INSURED seeking DAMAGES on account of such
BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE, even if any of
the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient, but the company shall not be obli-
gated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after
the applicable limit of the company's liability has been ex-
hausted by payment of judgments or settlements.5"
46. Migliore v. Sheet Metal Workers' Welfare Plan, 18 Cal. App. 3d 201, 204, 95
Cal. Rptr. 669, 671 (1971). The reasonable expectation doctrine dates as far back as Bird
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 51, 120 N.E. 86, 87 (1918) where the
court stated "[o]ur guide [to the resolution of a causation issue which determined the ex-
tent of the disputed insurance coverage] is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the
ordinary business man when making an ordinary business contract."
47. However, it should be conceded that if the insured reasonably expects to receive
certain benefits under a policy and the insurer reasonably expects not to provide such bene-
fits, the insured will prevail.
48. See. e.g., Osborne v. Security Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 201, 318 P.2d 94
(1957) in which the court interpreted in favor of the insured the use of the ambiguous word
"use" in an automobile insurance policy and found a duty to defend. See also Ritchie v.
Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955).
49. For example, in Greer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Surety Co., 37 Cal. App. 540, 544,
174 P. 110, 111 (1918), the court stated
[t]here is a more certain basis [than independent investigation] for a determina-
tion of the liability of the appellant [insurance company] to defend, and that basis
is to be found in the allegations of the complaint in each action for damages
against the respondent [insured]. We construe the policy to mean that it is the
duty of the appellant, under its terms, to defend every action in which the com-
plaint shows "a claim for damages covered by this policy."
The court, therefore, merely applied the language of the policy as it would do in other
contract situations.
50. R. KEETON, supra note 39, at 660.
[Vol. 23
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If the suit alleged actions which fell into the class of risks against
which the insurance contract promised to protect, the duty to de-
fend was invoked.5 One of the last cases to follow this proposition
to the letter was Maxon v. Security Insurance Company.52
In Maxon, the insurance company issued to a store owner a
policy which covered damages arising from both accidents and the
ownership, maintenance, use or operation of a retail store.53 The
policy contained a corresponding duty to defend any suits alleging
such injuries.54 After it was given a bad check, the store had the
customer arrested, but later dismissed the charges. The customer
brought suit against the store charging malicious prosecution. The
store informed its insurance company of the suit and requested a
defense under its policy. The insurer, however, refused this tender,
believing the policy did not cover the customer's allegations of an
intentional tort.55 The store prevailed in the suit against it brought
by the customer and then sued the insurance company seeking to
recover the money it expended in its defense.5
Before reaching the duty to defend issue, the district court ex-
amined the liability of the insurance company under the policy.
First, the court recognized that because the verdict reached in the
underlying suit exonerated the store, there was no injury for which
the store became legally obligated to pay.5 7 The court then ex-
amined the allegations against the store, and found that the cus-
tomer's suit was based solely on malicious prosecution, 58 an inten-
tional tort.59 Citing section 533 of the California Insurance Code 0
and section 1668 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,61 the
51. However, if there was no possibility of recovery under the policy, the insurance
company was under no duty to defend its insured. For example, in Weis v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 145, 64 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1954), the Minne-
sota Supreme Court found no duty to defend because the insured admitted that his actions
causing the claimant's injuries were deliberate thereby precluding indemnification.
52. 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
53. Id. at 607, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 608, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
56. Id. at 613, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
57. Id. at 614, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
58. Id. at 615, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
59. The elements of malicious prosecution are a judicial proceeding that is termi-
nated in favor of the complainant, want of probable cause in bringing the original action,
malice in the original prosecution, and resulting damages. Oppenheimer v. Tamblyn, 167
Cal. App. 2d 158, 160, 334 P.2d 152, 154 (1959).
60. An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he
is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents. CAL INS.
CODE § 533 (West 1985).
61. All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, exempting any-
one from responsibility for his own fraud, or his willful injury to the person or property of
another, or his violation of the law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
the law. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1668 (West 1985).
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court held that even had the store been found liable, the insurance
company would not have been obligated to indemnify against the
loss.
Turning to the issue of the insurance company's duty to defend,
the court noted the general rule at that time was that "the obliga-
tion to defend is measured by comparing the terms of the insur-
ance policy with the pleadings of the claimants who sue the in-
sured."62 Since the complaint against the store alleged only
malicious prosecution and since the court had determined that the
insurance company could not have become legally obligated to pay
for such damages, there was no duty to defend this action.63 The
court implicity recognized that there was no ambiguity in the in-
surance contract that would be resolved against the insurer. The
court found the language in the policy clear and merely applied
the precise words of the contract.
IV. THE FIRST CHANGE-GRAY V. ZURICH INSURANCE
COMPANY
The practice of solely examining the face of the pleadings to
determine whether a duty to defend existed was abandoned in
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company." The underlying suit in
Gray arose from a fight in which the insured was allegedly the
aggressor. The victim brought suit alleging that the insured "will-
fully, maliciously, brutally and intentionally assaulted" him.65 The
insured tendered the defense to his insurance company stating
that he acted in self-defense.66 The insurer refused to defend, be-
lieving that the complaint alleged only an intentional tort which
was not covered by the policy.67
The California Supreme Court reiterated the rules that any
doubts in an insurance policy must be resolved against the insurer
and that any exceptions to an insurer's obligation under the policy
must be clearly stated.68 The court recognized that an insurance
policy is, in effect, an adhesion contract. This in turn required that
the insured's reasonable expectations of the benefits to be received
under the policy control the court's interpretation.69 The duty to
62. Maxon, 214 Cal. App. 2d at 616, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
63. Id. at 617, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
64. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
65. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
66. The incident occurred after the insured almost collided with another car and the
driver of the car approached the insured in a threatening way at which time the insured
felt that he must defend himself.
67. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 268, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
68. Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
69. Id. at 269-70, 419 P.2d at 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
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defend clause in Gray was ambiguously drafted such that an in-
sured could "reasonably" expect the insurance company to pro-
vide a defense in this case. ° Since the obligation to indemnify
could not be determined until the tort suit was resolved, the ques-
tion of whether a duty to defend existed could not be answered
until that time.7 1 Thus, the court found that the insurer's promise
to defend was ambiguous because it depended on a court's finding
in the very suit in which the duty to defend could apply.7 2
In addition, the court also found uncertainty in the words of the
duty to defend clause. The language of the provision stated that
"the company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging
such bodily injury" even if the suit were groundless, false or
fraudulent..7  The court found this to be sweeping language that
could be interpreted by the insured to promise a defense for any
and all suits.7 4 Further, the exclusionary clause relied on by the
insurer, which provided that no coverage would lie for intentional
acts, was uncertain because "intentionally" could connote a differ-
ent meaning to a layman than to an insurance company.7 5 Since
there was no one clear meaning to the word "intentionally," there
was uncertainty in the contract. Rules of construction of insurance
policies in favor of the insured thus came into play.78 Due to the
reasonable expectation of the insured and the uncertainty of the
language of the policy, the court construed the contract against
the insurer and found a duty to defend even in a case alleging only
an intentional tort. 7
The court in Gray went further than merely requiring the insur-
ance company to defend the suit in this case. It also laid down the
policy that the insurer "bears a duty to defend its insured when-
ever it ascertains facts which give rise to a potential of liability
under the policy."178 The language in the allegations against the
insured would not be determinative of the insurer's duty to de-
70. Id. at 271-72, 419 P.2d at 173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
71. Id. at 272, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
74. Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
75. The layman might, for instance, believe that intentional acts might mean "collu-
sive, willful or planned action beyond the classical notion of intentional tort." Id. at 273,
419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
77. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 273-74, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
78. Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113. This in itself places a
burden on the insurance company as it may not deny coverage without instituting an inves-
tigation of the incident if it has reason to believe the potential for coverage might exist.
See, e.g., Mullen v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163, 173, 140 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611
(1977).
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fend.79 In perhaps the most novel proposition put forward to that
date in insurance law, the court intimated that the duty to defend
is much broader than the duty to indemnify.80 The burden was
now placed on the insurer to justify its refusal to defend its in-
sured. If any potential theory existed on which the claimant could
recover that would be covered by the policy, the insurer had the
duty to defend the suit.81
In Gray, the court placed a heavy burden on the insurance com-
pany by requiring that it provide a defense in virtually every suit
against one of its insureds.82 The court did so, however, by apply-
ing well-recognized principles of contract interpretation. Case law
had firmly established the rule that any and all ambiguities in an
insurance contract must be construed against the insurer.83 While
the court introduced the idea that the reasonable expectations of
the insured should control in such controversies, this arguably is
merely an assertion that the intent of the insured should be pre-
ferred over that of the insurer since, to the court, an insurance
policy may be in its purest form a contract of adhesion. 84 Since
the intent of the parties is critical in interpreting an ambiguous
instrument,85 the court in Gray did no more than follow contract
law in expanding the duty to defend.
V. THE NEXT STEP-THE EXECUTiVE AVIATION CASE
The next major case to impact insurance companies and their
duty to defend was Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Insurance
Underwriters.88 This case involved a claim after an airplane acci-
79. For example, the court recognized the possibility that an amended complaint
could be filed which could allege damages which would be covered. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at
276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
80. While the court did not use this precise language in Gray, subsequent courts
have interpreted the holding of Gray in this way. See, e.g., Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc.
v. Allstate, 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 584, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (1976), where the court'
stated "[u]nder Gray, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify."
81. This is not to say that the insurance company had no recourse when it found
itself in such situations. The court recognized the procedure whereby the insurer defended
under a reservation of rights. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 419 P.2d at 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. at
114. By so doing, the insurer has the opportunity to later assert its noncoverage defense
and still provide its insured with the required defense. See supra note 4.
82. As the court noted, the victim is not concerned with what theory he will recover
on; his only purpose is to obtain the largest judgment a court will award. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d
at 279, 419 P.2d at 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114. Hence, suits against an insured will contain
all possible allegations of both negligence and intentional acts. Thus, the duty to defend
will be invoked in almost all suits since claims of negligence will be included in complaints
whenever possible.
83. See supra notes 40-41.
84. See supra note 40.
85. A. CORBIN. CONTRACrs § 95 (1952).
86. 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
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dent. The insurance policy protecting the company that owned the
plane provided coverage for injuries arising out of the proper use
of an aircraft.87 The policy contained an exclusion clause which
disclaimed coverage for accidents occurring when the plane was
piloted by someone who did not have the qualifications specified in
an endorsement to the policy.88 After the plane disappeared and
was apparently lost or destroyed, the insurer notified its insured
that the policy did not apply to any claims arising from the acci-
dent because the pilot did not meet the specified requirements. 89
Therefore, the defense of any claims were subject to a reservation
of rights to determine if the policy should apply to the accident.
The insured brought a declaratory relief action against its insurer
to determine if the insurer's position was correct. Soon after, the
heirs of one of the passengers filed a wrongful death suit against
both the insurer and the insured.90 The insurer hired the same
attorneys to defend both its own interests in the declaratory relief
action and its interests and those of its insured in the wrongful
death suit.9'
The court of appeals first restated the rule of Gray that an in-
surer must "defend its insured pursuant to the provisions of its
contract and do nothing that would injure the interests of its in-
sured.19 2 However, the court also recognized that there was an
unsolvable conflict of interest in these cases. In the declaratory
relief action, the insurer would want to prove that the plane was
being used in common carriage and thus the pilot was not quali-
fied under the terms of the policy, which would preclude cover-
age.93 Conversely, in the wrongful death suit, the insured would
try to prove the plane was being flown in a private carriage opera-
tion and hence the pilot was qualified.94 Since the same attorneys
were used in both cases to defend both the insurer and the in-
87. Id. at 803, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
88. Id. The policy was effective "only while being piloted by any Pilot while holding
a valid Private or Commercial Pilot Certificate with Appropriate F.A.A. Ratings for the
operation being performed" and only when the plane was being flown by "Any Commercial
Pilot Properly Rated in Type and Qualified for the aircraft and flight and having a mini-
mum of 2,000 flying hours experience as a Pilot." It was alleged, however, that the pilot at
the time of the accident was prevented as a result of disciplinary proceedings from flying
passengers in common carriage, but could fly private carriage operations such as demon-
stration flights. Thus, the applicability of the exclusionary clauses, and hence the policy
itself, turned on a finding of whether or not the plane was being flown in public
transportation.
89. Id. at 804, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 809-10, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
92. Id. at 809, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
93. Id. at 804, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
94. Id.
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sured, and since the decision in each turned on an opposite finding
of common carriage or private carriage, an actual conflict of inter-
est had arisen and the lawyers could not successfully appear in
both suits.95 Therefore, the court concluded that "the insurer's ob-
ligation to defend extends to paying the reasonable value of the
legal services and costs performed by independent counsel, se-
lected by the insured."9 The court of appeal, like the supreme
court in Gray, stated that it was merely applying standard princi-
ples of contract interpretation and found that the insurance policy
failed "to provide with any degree of clarity for this conflict of
interest contingency in drafting the terms of its contract. ' 97 This
explanation may be unsatisfactory since the court did not expound
on the uncertainty in the policy nor apply the "reasonable expec-
tation" doctrine developed in Gray. At the very least, however, the
court acknowledged that it was attempting to invoke contract
principles, albeit in a liberal fashion. 8
While Executive Aviation represented a notable departure from
the manner in which insurance companies previously had handled
their clients' defense, it did not have a tremendous impact because
the decision was applied only to those cases in which an actual
conflict of interest was present.99 Cumis, however, extends the ob-
ligation of the insurer to pay for independent counsel in all cases
in which a coverage issue might be present.
VI. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN CUMIS
In its Cumis decision, the court of appeals first stated that when
an insurer issues a reservation of rights, there is no longer a com-
monality of interest among insurer, insured and attorney.100 By
definition, a reservation of rights embodies an insurer's belief that
a claim might not fall under the protection of the policy.101 The
court therefore believed that an insurer might direct the litigation
towards showing that the policy does not cover the allegations
95. Id. at 809-10, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
96. Id. at 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
97. Id.
98. The unsatisfying aspect of this case is thus not that the insured is entitled to
independent counsel when a conflict of interest arises, but rather the court's seeming reli-
ance on Prashker v. United States Guarantee Co., I N.Y.2d 584, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 136
N.E.2d 871 (1956), when it stated that a "reasonable solution" was adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals that the insurer should be responsible for the cost of independent
counsel in conflict of interest situations; however, the New York court provided no author-
ity for its decision.
99. See, e.g., Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir.
1981).
100. Cumls, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
101. See supra note 4.
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against the insured which, of course, would be contrary to the in-
sured's interests.0 2 The attorney finds himself in an ethical di-
lemma as, in the court's view, he is now representing clients with
conflicting interests.103 In fact, the attorney might be tempted to
favor the insurer because of the continuing relationship between
these two parties and the lack of any future connection between
attorney and insured.10 4 Although no actual conflict of interest has
yet appeared, if an insurer reserves its right to later disclaim cov-
erage, it immediately is liable for the cost of independent counsel
because such a conflict might appear at some later date.10 5
While the court's belief that such a potential conflict of interest
entitles an insured to independent counsel is disputable, 06 a more
important question remains: Where in the policy did the court find
language obliging the insurer to pay for this independent attor-
ney? The court relied on Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Com-
pany 07 in which the California Supreme Court held that the in-
surer cannot require the insured to surrender control of the
litigation when a conflict of interest arises. 108 From this rule, the
court in Cumis held that
[a]lthough Tomerlin did not expressly state the insurer had to
pay for the insured's independent counsel under such circum-
stances [as arise when there exists the potential for a conflict of
interest], this is necessarily implicit in the decision. If the in-
surer must pay for the cost of defense and, when a conflict ex-
ists, the insured may have control of the defense if he wishes, it
follows the insurer must pay for such defenses conducted by in-
dependent counsel.109
102. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
103. Id. at 364-65, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
104. Brief for Respondent at 26, Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
105. For a discussion of the issue of conflict of interest as it relates to the Cumis
decision, see Comment, Reexamining Conflicts of Interest: When is Private Counsel Nec-
essary?, 17 PAc. LJ. 1421 (1986).
106. For example, as explained infra text accompanying notes 137-42, the insurer
and its attorney must always give priority to the insured's interests.
107. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964). In Tomerlin, the
insurer provided its insured an attorney after an incident resulted in a complaint alleging
assault and battery against the insured. Consequently, the insurer reserved its rights to
later dispute coverage. The insured hired an independent attorney but dismissed him after
the insurer stated that the reservation of rights was no longer in effect. After the insured
was found liable for assault and battery, the insurer refused to indemnify him. While rul-
ing that the insurer could not manipulate the insured such that he gives up his independent
attorney and surrenders the litigation to the insurer, the court nowhere stated in its opinion
that the independent attorney should be paid for by the insurer. That is, Tomerlin simply
states that an insured is entitled to independent counsel if the insured so desires.
108. Id. at 648, 394 P.2d at 577, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 737. However, it should be noted
that in the absence of such a conflict, the insurer retains control of the defense. Spindle v.
Chubb Pac. Indem. Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 713, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776, 780-81 (1979).
109. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
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The court failed, however, to cite an ambiguous provision in the
policy enabling it to make this ruling. Additionally, it failed to
identify the reasonable expectation of the insured entitling him to
this payment. Rather, the court rewrote an unambiguous policy to
provide an additional benefit to the insured at the expense of the
insurer.
The court of appeal, in effect, gave no rationale for its holding.
By not doing so, the court failed to recognize that it was deciding
a contract dispute.110 The court could have tried to liberally apply
the rules of construing an insurance contract. By not applying
contract principles at all, however, the court ignored the fact that
an agreement had been reached between insurer and insured that
should have been honored. Even if a contract of adhesion, the pol-
icy at least represented the reasonable expectations of the two
parties which should have guided the court in its application of
the contract's terms. Both parties had bargained for the policy,
the insurer providing coverage in exchange for the insured's pre-
mium. 1 A contract had been signed, necessitating the application
of contract principles in its interpretation, albeit weighted heavily
in favor of the insured." 2 The court was on solid ground in its
analysis leading up to its ultimate decision that an insurer must
defend any action that might be covered under the policy by rely-
ing on Gray and its application of contract rules. However, the
court went beyond Gray (and even beyond Executive Aviation)
and imposed a tremendous burden on the insurer by requiring the
insurer to provide independent counsel if it simply reserves its
right to later dispute coverage. Had the court applied the princi-
ples of Gray, it would have had a more difficult time ruling that
independent counsel should be provided in such cases paid for by
the insurance company. This might explain the route taken by the
110. In a footnote, the court cited those decisions which supported its decision. Id. at
373 n.9, 208 Cal. Rptr 504 n.9. However, only two decisions, Magoun v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964), and Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals,
103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397 (1968), included the court's rationale that the insurance con-
tract was too uncertain in that the insurer could have "included in the covenant to defend
explicit provisions concerning the cost of defense in various situations," Magoun, 346 Mass.
at 685, 195 N.E.2d at 519, or could have "set forth its provisions in such clear and distinct
language as would have avoided any doubt relative to the extent of its duty to defend."
Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 103 R.I. at 635, 240 A.2d at 404. One other court cited in
Cumis touched briefly on the contractual basis for its holding. In Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peppers, 64 I11. 2d 187, 199, 355 N.E.2d 24, 30 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court merely
stated that "(b]y reason of [the insurer's] contractual obligation to furnish [the insured] a
defense it must reimburse him for the reasonable cost of defending the action." 64 Ill. 2d
at 199, 355 N.E.2d at 30.
111. See supra note 29 for examples of cases holding an insurance policy is a
contract.
112. See supra text accompanying note 40 for a description of this policy.
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Cumis court.
The "reasonable expectation" aspect of Gray is probably the
most difficult principle to harmonize with the decision in
Cumis.113 As stated in Gray,
[a]n examination of the policy discloses that the broadly stated
promise to defend is not conspicuously or clearly conditioned
solely on [a particular event, in this case on] a nonintentional
bodily injury; instead, the insured could reasonably expect such
protection [in cases that might be found to involve such an
injury]."114
An insured undoubtedly can expect a defense from his insurance
company when a suit is filed against him. Expecting two defenses
each of which is to be paid for by the insurer when there is a mere
possibility of a conflict of interest is, however, unreasonable.115
In fact, in its letter to Cumis before trial of the underlying suit,
the Credit Union stated that it desired Cumis to settle the under-
lying action. The letter read: "You [Cumis] should know that the
Credit Union desires the lawsuit to be settled without trial. Our
insurance coverages, duly paid and contracted for, are precisely
for such cases and any settlement liability that may arise there-
from." 118 The Credit Union itself explained what it expected from
Cumis: Representation in its best interests, 17 not independent
counsel to be paid by Cumis.118 The court in Cumis thus has si-
lently abandoned the previous position that the reasonable expec-
tation of the insured will govern the extent of the coverage suppos-
edly agreed upon by both parties.119
Additionally, the court seemingly has violated the rule that a
113. Ironically, the credit union argued that the policy itself was ambiguous and that
it could reasonably expect an independent attorney to be paid for by Cumis. The credit
union argued further that since the policy was silent on the issue of a defense in conflict of
interest situation, the policy not only should be strictly construed against Cumis but also
Cumis should pay for an independent attorney. Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, at
23-24. Unfortunately, the court failed to address these contentions in its opinion.
114. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 272, 419 P.2d 168, 173, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 109 (1966).
115. As argued by Cumis, this situation is different from that in which there is an
actual conflict of interest as in Executive Aviation. In the latter case, an insured reasonably
may expect payment for an independent attorney because the company will act in its own
interests which are contrary to those of its insured. Yet, the insurer is obligated always to
act in the insured's best interests. See infra text accompanying notes 137-42. The only way
that the insurer can do beth is to hire independent counsel for its insured.
116. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 137-42 for a discussion regarding Cumis'
obligation to favor the credit union's interests at all times during the suit.
118. The credit union's letter indicated that it was satisfied with the attorney pro-
vided by Cumis although it did express its wish that the suit be settled.
119. For application of the "reasonable expectation" doctrine, see discussion of Gray,
supra, text accompanying notes 64-85.
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court should not strain to find an ambiguity where none exists.120
Again, this relates to the reasonableness of the interpretation of
the language of the policy. That is, there must be two fair and
reasonable meanings of the words used in the policy before the
court can intercede.' 2' Yet, the problem with the court's decision
in Cumis is whether a duty to defend can be interpreted to require
payment for an independent lawyer. The insurer in Cumis con-
tended that it had satisfied the requirement of Gray when it pro-
vided a defense for its insured. The court, however, dispensed with
this argument by distinguishing the facts of Gray.1 22 Rather than
relying on the express law in Gray that an insurer must defend
any action on behalf of its insured which potentially is covered by
the policy, the court turned to the implications it found in Tomer-
lin. The question remains, however, whether there is any ambigu-
ity in a duty to defend clause after Gray. Specifically, if no rea-
sonable interpretation of, and hence reasonable expectation
concerning, the duty to defend included payment for an indepen-
dent lawyer, the court completed its analysis of this duty with its
ruling in Gray.
By failing to identify the provision or provisions in the policy
that could be interpreted as requiring payment for another lawyer,
the court in Cumis created ambiguity in the policy where none
existed which arguably makes meaningless the express terms of
the contract. This creates uncertainty in contractual obligations
since the court could, and arguably did in Cumis, violate the in-
tentions of the parties through its own interpretations. By simply
reaching its decision in Cumis, the court has created a new role
for itself: Drafter, rather than interpreter, of an insurance con-
tract. The court never addressed its assumption of this expanded
role, preferring to hold that the duty to pay for other counsel is
implicit in prior decisions.1 23
Finally, the court failed to explain its holding with regard to the
120. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 38 Cal. 2d 73,81,237 P.2d 510,514
(1951).
121. Continental Savings Ass'n v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 762
F.2d 1239,1245 (5th Cir. 1985), modified 768 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Entzmin-
ger v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 652 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1st
Dist. 1983).
122. The court stated that "Gray is not controlling here because it does not address
whether the scope of the duty to defend includes payment for the insured's independent
counsel where a conflict of interest exists." Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 368, 208 Cal Rptr.
at 501. However, Gray in fact ruled that the insurer was legally and ethically responsible
for the defense of its insured, even in cases involving conflicts of interest, which was lan-
guage seemingly broad enough to include the present situation. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 279
n.18, 419 P.2d at 178 n.18, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114 n.18.
123. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
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decision in Jarrett v. Allstate Insurance Company 24 in which the
court held that it would not construe an insurance policy so as to
create a liability where none had existed. In order to decide
Cumis, the court necessarily had to find a preexisting duty to pro-
vide and pay for independent counsel. However, no reference was
made to any such obligation; rather, the court appeared to create
the duty in its decision. Had an insurance company promised to
pay for independent counsel in its policy, this commitment should
have been found in Gray as that case involved similar allegations
against the insured.1 25 There, the court instead restricted its hold-
ing to providing a defense, not paying for two counsels. The
Cumis court deviated from the holding in Gray that the insurer's
contractual commitment extended only to providing a defense, not
paying for a defense conducted by an independent lawyer. There
is no indication in either Cumis or Gray that the insurer had ex-
plicitly or implicitly assumed the duty to make such payments in
its policy. Yet, the court in Cumis failed to identify from where in
the insurance contract the duty to pay for independent counsel
arose.
The court also failed to note that prior to Cumis, an aggrieved
insured did have an adequate remedy. If an insured believed that
he had been treated improperly by his insurer or inadequately rep-
resented by counsel, he could bring an action against the insurer.
Such suits alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing,12 6 a clause which is "in every contract, including policies
of insurance, . . . that neither party will do anything which will
injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agree-
ment."1' " The California Supreme Court has specifically recog-
nized that "[o]ne of the most important benefits of a maximum
limit policy is the assurance that the company will provide the
insured with defense and indemnification for the purpose of pro-
124. 209 Cal. App. 2d 804, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1962).
125. Both cases involved conflicts of interest in terms of demands in excess of policy
limits and allegations that the insured's actions were intentional and hence not covered by
the policy.
126. "Although the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is couched in contrac-
tual terms, it is largely a creation of tort law." San Jose Production Credit Ass'n v. Old
Republic Life Ins. Co., 723 F.2d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 1984).
127. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173,
176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967) (citing Comunale v. Traders and Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.
2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958)). There is a reciprocal duty imposed on the insured by his
policy to act in good faith toward the insurance company. However, the insurance com-
pany's duty to act in good faith is unconditional. Therefore, a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by the insured does not justify a similar breach by the insurer.
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 577-78, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 488 (1973).
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tecting him from liability." 128 This duty is not merely found in
case law. There are also statutory provisions prescribing the con-
duct of both the insurance company129 and the attorney1 30 in deal-
128. Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
912, 918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980).
129. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1986), also known as the Unfair Prac-
tices Act, provides in pertinent part:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance ... (h) Knowingly commit-
ting or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice
any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions re-
lating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications
with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investiga-
tion and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after
proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recov-
ered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims
for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or
printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative,
agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon
request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of com-
pelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded
in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and
then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of
which submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements
under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
This statute has been the basis for recovery by an insured even if the insurer was accused
of one instance of misconduct provided that the action was knowingly done or was part of a
regular business practice. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d
785, 647 P.2d 86, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1982).
130. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West Supp. 1986) provides that
It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following:
(a) To support the Constitution and law of the United States and of this state.
(b) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
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ing with an insured when a suit is brought against the insured.
If an insured prevailed in such a suit, he could be awarded gen-
eral damages, 131 damages for emotional distress,132 attorney's fees
in the underlying suit brought against him by the injured party1 33
and punitive damages if he could prove that the insurer acted
"maliciously, with an intent to oppress, [or] in conscious disregard
of the rights of its insured." 134 Punitive damages could be
awarded on a showing of an established course of action by the
insurer.13 5 The possibility of recovery by an insured seems to ade-
quately protect him from any tortious behavior on the part of the
insurer or its attorney. Conversely, this possibility of recovery, es-
pecially of punitive damages,138 seemingly would also cause the
insurer to treat its insured with the utmost degree of care.
An issue then arose as to when an insured could successfully
bring a bad faith action against his insurer or his attorney. Once
an insurer accepts the tender of a defense from its insured, it is
obligated to act in the best interests of its insured at all times.137
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as appear to
him or her legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public
offense.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her
such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to
preserve the secrets, of his or her client.
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he or she is charged.
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest.
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause
of the defenseless or the oppressed.
(i) To cooperate and participate in any State Bar proceeding pending against the
attorney. However, this subdivision shall not be construed to deprive an attorney
of any constitutional or statutory privileges.
131. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974).
132. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13.
133. Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 693 P.2d 796, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1985).
134. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 923, 582 P.2d 980, 986-87, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389, 395-96 (1978).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 3d 610, 197
Cal. Rptr. 878 (1984).
137. Ivy v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 659, 320, P.2d 140,
146 (1958), where the court stated:
The insurance company has the legal right to try and protect its own financial
interests, but when those interests conflict with those of the insured, the company
must, in good faith, give consideration to the interests of the insured. It has no
right to sacrifice the interests of the insured in order to protect its own interests.
Therefore, arguably there are no conflicts of interests in insurance defense cases. Any time
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Additionally, "[insofar as the insured is concerned the attorney
owes him the same obligations of good faith and fidelity as if he
had retained the attorney personally." 13 8 There are three major
types of cases in which a bad faith suit can be maintained success-
fully: (1) those in which the insurer wrongfully refuses to accept
the defense of its insured;13" 9 (2) those in which the insurer, once it
agrees to defend the action, refuses to accept a settlement offer
within the policy limits;140 and (3) those in which the lawyer re-
tained by the insurer acts to the detriment of the interests of the
insured. In all of these situations, the insurer has promoted its
own interests to the detriment of the insured entitling the insured
to damages. The court in Cumis, however, failed to explain its
reason for not having the credit union pursue this remedy.1 42 Ap-
the desires of the insured and the insurer collide, the interest of the former must take
precedence over that of the latter. As recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court,
[i]f the judgment in the original action is not binding upon the insurer or insured
in a subsequent action on the issue of coverage, there would be no conflict of
interests between the insurer and the insured in the sense that the insurer could
gain any advantage in the original action which would accrue to it in a subsequent
action in which coverage is in issue.
Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court held, the rule of estoppel by judgment should not be
applied in actions involving insurance coverage. Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254
Or. 496, 511, 460 P.2d 342, 348-49 (1969).
138. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968).
See also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 598 P.2d 452, 456,
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 486 (1979), where the California Supreme Court stated that "[flor the
insurer to fulfill its obligation not to impair the right of the insured to receive the benefits
of the agreement, it must again give at least as much consideration to the latter's interest
as it does to its own."
139. See e.g., Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 636 P.2d 32, 178
Cal. Rptr. 343 (1981).
140. See Criscl, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated that Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, makes clear
that "liability based on an implied covenant exists whenever the insurer refuses to settle in
an appropriate case and that liability may exist when the insurer unwarrantedly refuses an
offered settlement where the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is by ac-
cepting the settlement." 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17. See
also Samson, 30 Cal. 3d 220, 636 P.2d 32, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343; Johansen v. California
State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123
Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
141. Ivy, 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140, in which the insurer's attorney com-
mitted the insured to a judgment in excess of his policy limits without disclosing this action
with the insured. The court had little difficulty finding this to be a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
142. The credit union possibly could have prevailed in a bad faith suit against
Cumis. The credit union could have argued two theories: First, Cumis never discussed the
proposed settlement in the Eisenmann action with the credit union. Thus, as in Ivy, the
insurer acted without informing the insured, in effect exposing the latter to liability be-
cause of the punitive damages award. This implies that Cumis did not properly promote
the credit union's interests. Second, Cumis did not settle the underlying litigation despite a
demand within the policy limits. Cumis might have been found to have violated its statu-
tory duty to settle under California Insurance Code § 790.03(h)(5) as well as the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the credit union became obligated to pay
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parently the court has tacitly disapproved of the existing solution
of a bad faith suit brought by an insured without commenting as
to any deficiencies in such relief.
The opinion in Cumis appears incomplete because it failed to
include any discussion of accepted contract principles and any ex-
planation of the inadequacy of the existing course of remedial ac-
tion. If the court had acknowledged that the insurance policy is a
contract and had attempted to apply the corresponding rules of
interpretation, the decision, while perhaps not popular with cer-
tain parties and industries, at least would have avoided some of
the uncertainties which it has created.
VII. THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CUMIS
Thus far, only a handfull of cases have begun the long process
of refining the Cumis ruling. 143 However, the courts have yet to
issue definitive answers to such questions as: 1) What are reasona-
ble attorney's fees; 2) how, or whether, an insurer can effectively
reserve its rights to later assert a coverage defense without sub-
jecting itself to the requirement of paying for independent counsel;
3) how much, if any, information must be shared between the at-
torneys; 4) what is the liability, if any, of the insurer when it fails
to meet its statutory duty to settle under California Insurance
Code sec. 790.03(h)(12) because the independent attorney refuses
to authorize a settlement; and 5) what is the liability, if any, of
the insurer's attorney for the bad faith actions of the independent
counsel? Many other issues likely will arise in the future.
The Cumis decision initially has caused confusion and conster-
nation in the insurance industry with regard to the proper action
to be taken when faced with a situation in which a reservation of
rights letter had previously sufficed. The potential ramifications of
Cumis, however, extend much further. By avoiding established
contract principles, 4 4 the court has left uncertain the viability and
enforceability of the express provisions of the insurance contract.
While a court will almost certainly never dispense with an insur-
punitive damages it could have avoided had the case settled. Thus, Cumis would have been
liable for all resulting damages from the judgment against the credit union in the underly-
ing suit. See Samson, 30 Cal. 3d 220, 636 P.2d 32, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343; Johansen, 15 Cal.
3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288.
143. See, e.g., McGee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1985); Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 210 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1985) in which the courts pointed out that an independent attorney must be paid for by
the insurer only in cases in which a coverage dispute exists.
144. These principles include those that have been identified supra text accompany-
ing notes 29-47, including the definition of ambiguity, the role of the court in resolving
such uncertainties and the restraint exercised by the court when no ambiguities are found.
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ance policy in its entirety, the holding in Cumis nevertheless rep-
resents a significant departure from the usual role of the court in
deciding insurance cases. The court in effect rewrote the insurance
contract to impose an obligation on the insurer where none had
previously existed.1,4 The problem with this action is twofold.
First, the cost of insurance necessarily will increase. Rather than
hiring one lawyer to represent its interests and those of its insured,
the insurance company now must pay for an additional attorney
for the insured, if he so requests, if there is a possibility of a con-
flict of interest.1 48 This increase in costs will have to be accounted
for in some way.147 The increased costs most likely will be passed
on to the consumer in the form of even higher rates or perhaps in
the form of elimination of certain types of coverage if the costs
become astronomical.
This detrimental aspect of Cumis, however, is relatively minor
compared to the holding's second potential effect. Assuming first
that a bad faith suit does not adequately protect an insured in
potential conflict of interest situations and second that an insured
does need independent representation, the question still remains in
the Cumis ruling: Where in the insurance contract did the insurer.
agree to pay for such counsel when it merely reserves its right to
later dispute coverage? The court failed to view the policy as a
contract, apparently preferring to base its decision on ethical prin-
ciples. 148 The Cumis holding would be more palatable had the
court recognized the settled principle that an insurance policy is a
contract subject to certain rules of interpretation. While any alter-
145. That the court did the same thing in Executive Aviation, is arguable; however,
the holding in that case was not as far-reaching since it was applied only to actual contro-
versies whereas Cumis seemingly applies to any and all possible conflicts of interest. Fur-
ther, as noted above, the court attempted to use some rules of contract interpretation in
Executive Aviation. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
146. While the number of insureds requesting additional counsel cannot be pre-
dicted, the potential for such demands is tremendous because of the general practice of
pleading numerous alternative theories of recovery. Many of these causes of action include
prayers for punitive damages which are not covered by insurance policies, immediately
creating a conflict of interest.
147. Although the exact increase in costs is unknown, see, e.g., Berg, After Cumis:
Regaining Control of the Defense, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 1985, at 13, 14, wherein the
author estimates that a suit "which might have been defended quite adequately for $50,000
to $100,000 may ultimately cost the insurer ten to twenty times that amount."
148. The court arguably has the inherent power to create rights and duties as it sees
fit: This is what it has done with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which
is not expressly found in an insurance policy. There are three difficulties with such as asser-
tion, however: First, if the court was creating a new duty, it should have stated it was doing
so; second, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is found in every contract,
not just insurance policies; and third, a duty such as good faith and fair dealing obligates
both parties to conduct themselves in certain ways. The increased duty found in Cumis,
however, falls squarely on the insurer. If the court is to imply a new provision in a policy,
the provision should be one that has reciprocal rights and duties.
[Vol. 23
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native rationale admittedly would be subject to its own criti-
cisms, 114 at least the court could have preserved the integrity of
the insurance policy as a binding agreement.
While the outcome of Cumis may not be liked, the way in
which the court reached its decision is far more disturbing. The
implication of the court's reasoning is unclear with respect to the
strength of the policy as an instrument which describes the rights
and obligations of the parties. If the court disregards the words of
the policy and the reasonable expectations of the parties involved,
there is no longer any use for the policy itself. Instead, the liabil-
ity of the insurer will depend on a court's ruling. Neither insurer
nor insured will be able to foresee their respective obligations or
rights which were previously enumerated in the policy. The court
may have unnecessarily cast itself in a new, and perhaps un-
wanted, role in which it will have to redefine and apply the seem-
ingly clear and unambiguous provisions of a policy which had
been agreed upon by both insurer and insured.
For example, assume A is driving B in A's car. B distracts A
who collides with another car injuring those occupants. They sue
B for negligence in distracting A. B tenders defense of the suit to
his automobile insurance company claiming that he was "using"
the automobile as defined in his liability policy because, even
though he was not driving, he was being transported in the car
which is its normal purpose. In light of Cumis, B's insurer would
probably be reluctant to refuse the defense despite this strained
application of the word "use" by B. Arguably, if Cumis indeed
reduces the applicability of contract principles, the insurer can no
longer claim that this is not the sort of protection that B could
reasonably expect from it, nor that the defense would create an
obligation of the insured where none had previously existed. In
fact, the insurer could not issue a reservation of rights without
facing the potential of being financially responsible for another
lawyer. Instead, the insurance company unhappily might have to
defend B even though it had no intention of protecting against this
sort of risk when it issued the policy.115
149. Although it would have been more difficult to reach, the same ruling could have
been reached by, perhaps, finding that the insured had a reasonable expectation of payment
for independent counsel or that there was some ambiguity in the policy justifying the
decision.
150. This situation actually was brought before a court in Potomac Ins. Co. v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 188 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Cal. 1960). The court held that B's insurance
company was not obligated to defend him, stating:
It is the opinion of his court that no reasonable person could thusly construe the
language of the policy; to do so would, in effect, extend its coverage to any situa-
tion wherein the insured is the occupant of the automobile. Clearly, this is neither
the intended nor apparent meaning of the policy.
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Further, that the court restricted its holding in Cumis to the
duty to defend is not clear. That is, by not recognizing an insur-
ance policy as a contract, the normal rules of determining liability
may also have been correspondingly expanded. Although this issue
has not been addressed, if the court continues in this active role,
there are in reality few, if any, limitations on the imposition of
liability where an insurance policy is not recognized as a contract.
Thus, in the above example, B's insurer may be responsible not
only for B's defense, but also for the damage to the injured per-
sons if the court stretches the terms in the policy to include this
situation.
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO CUMIS
A number of solutions have been proposed to eliminate or at
least deal with the requirements of Cumis. 51 The most drastic
suggestion is that an insurer simply delete the duty to defend
clause from its policy. This would be an unsatisfactory step, how-
ever, for two primary reasons. First, an insurer would not want to
surrender its interest in reaching a settlement or in defending a
suit. If it did so, the insurer would be bound by the actions of the
insured, the reverse of what the Cumis decision purported to elim-
inate. Second, due to the view of some courts that insurance poli-
cies are contracts of adhesion, a court might not allow an insurer
to eliminate this clause which would place the entire responsibility
for a defense on the insured.152
A second solution is that an insurer limit the cost of defense it
would be willing to assume. Here again, however, the same
problems as described above would be encountered, although on a
lesser scale, as the insurer would participate to a predetermined
point. After this point, the insurer would withdraw from the litiga-
tion, shifting the remaining burden to the insured.
Another solution is that an insurer participate in the selection of
independent counsel as allowed by New York State Urban Devel-
opment Corp. v. VSL Corp.153 This would allow an insurer at least
However, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 113-19, courts may no longer be
applying the "reasonable expectations" standard. Therefore, a court today might not follow
this precedent. The argument could be made that the insurer should expressly disclaim
liability in situations such as this in its policy. This example, however, also demonstrates
the immense difficulty that would be encountered in trying to provide for any and all possi-
ble circumstances.
151. For a more detailed discussion of each of the following, see Berg, supra note
147, at 14-19.
152. Kornblum and Olson, The Cumis Decision: When Does it Control in Conflict
Situations?, VERDICT, Nov. 1985, at 12.
153. 738 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1984) where the Court of Appeals admitted that "it is
not inherently objectionable to permit an insurer to participate in the selection of indepen-
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to choose competent counsel and perhaps control the cost of litiga-
tion to a limited degree.
None of these solutions, nor any others proposed to date, ad-
dress the issue that the policy nowhere requires the insurer to as-
sume the cost of the additional representation. Perhaps the best
solution is simply to return to the pre-Cumis situation: If an in-
sured feels he has not received competent representation, he can
bring a bad faith suit against his insurer. The court has seemingly
assumed that insurance companies and their lawyers will work to
the detriment of the insured in all cases. However, the spectre of a
bad faith suit against the insurer and the attorney in reality forces
both to act in the best interests of the insured at all times. Fur-
ther, the cost of this additional lawyer would be avoided which
would benefit all insureds. Litigation would also progress in a
much smoother fashion as only one attorney would be involved on
behalf of the insured and insurer.1 " Finally, the principle that an
insurance policy is a contract would remain in force, relieving the
court of its new duty of resolving potentially all disputes between
insurer and insured. All of these results would be accomplished
without eroding an insured's rights to a defense for he would have
the bad faith suit available as a remedy for any wrongs committed
by the insurer or its attorney.155
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the insurance industry is a business which seeks
profits. Therefore, insurance companies draft their policies to en-
able them to profit while satisfying consumer needs. A conflict ex-
ists between insurer and insured because of the necessity of insur-
ance in today's world.156 The costs faced by the consumer who
fails to secure insurance are such that adequate coverage is of the
utmost importance. An insured is placed in an inferior bargaining
position to his insurer because of this pressing need. Due to the
very real lack of bargaining power in negotiating insurance poli-
cies, an insured does require protection from arbitrary or even
dent counsel for the insured as long as the insurer discharges its obligation in good faith
and the attorney chosen is truly independent and otherwise capable of defending the in-
sured." See also Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Suffolk,
751 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1985).
154. In contrast, in the underlying suit in Cumis, there were three defendants (the
Credit Union and two of its employees), meaning at a minimum, four attorneys could be
involved, one to represent Cumis' interests, and one for each of the defendants.
155. Of course, in future cases, a court could simply apply the contract principles
which the Cumis court failed to address. By its silence, however, the Cumis court may
have tacitly admitted that it could not invoke these rules and come to the same ruling.
156. The insurer wants to operate at a profit and thus reduce expenses while the
insured desires the greatest benefits at the lowest cost.
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wrongful actions by its insurer. However, an insurance policy is in
reality a contract between the insurer and insured. Thus, while the
insured's needs may weigh more heavily in policy interpretation
questions because of the insurer's superior bargaining strength, a
balance between the interests of the two parties must nevertheless
be reached. While the insurer may not disregard its insured in its
actions, neither may the insured's wishes be promoted without re-
spect for the insurer's wishes, since this is not what the insurer
had bargained for. The standard rules of contract interpretation,
modified to compensate for the insured's weaker voice, strike the
necessary balance between the competing interests of the two. 1
5 7
A critical aspect of any insurance policy to both parties is the
right and duty of an insurer to defend actions brought against the
insured under his policy. The prospect of liability compels the in-
surer to accept the defense of such suits to protect its interests.
With the inclusion of a duty to defend clause in the contract
comes the assumption and expectation by the insured that part of
the premium he pays entitles him to such a defense. 158 The prob-
lem that courts must then resolve is the extent of the insurer's
obligation and the insured's expectations.
The court in Cumis, however, both failed to act in its tradi-
tional role as interpreter of a vague instrument and failed to de-
termine and apply the credit union's reasonable expectations of a
defense under its policy with Cumis. Instead, the court itself de-
cided that Cumis' policy tacitly contained the obligation that
Cumis would pay for an independent attorney when it issued a
reservation of ights. The court failed to note any ambiguity in the
policy with respect to the duty to defend to justify its rewriting
the express provisions as it did. Nor did it indicate that the credit
union reasonably expected to be represented by an independent
attorney to be paid for by Cumis. 1 59
In summation, this Note has explained those contract rules that
should apply to the interpretation of insurance policies and their
application prior to Cumis with regard to the insurer's duty to
defend.160 Then it examined the changes that Cumis has made in
157. The primary compensatory device employed by the courts is to resolve any and
all ambiguities in the policy in favor of the insured. See supra text accompanying note 40.
158. Prior to Cumis, this expectation was limited initially by the requirement that
the actions alleged against the insured be covered by the policy although after Gray, the
scope of covered actions, at least for defense purposes, was extremely broad.
159. Cumis did pay the first two bills in nominal amounts before it had ascertained
that there was no existing conflict of interest. But, once the conclusion had been reached
that there was no conflict, Cumis immediately indicated to the credit union that it would
not pay any further costs of the independent attorney. Cumis, 162 App. 3d at 363, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 497.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 29-99.
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this duty to defend, identifying the failure of the court to apply
general contract principles. 61 This Note then analyzed the dan-
gers of the court's embarking on this course of active interference
in contractual relations.' 6 2 Finally, it argued that the remedy in
effect prior to Cumis was more than adequate to protect the inter-
ests of the insured. 163
Initially, of course, the focus of insurance companies' dismay is
their increased costs. The argument that a bad faith suit was an
adequate remedy for an insured injured by the acts of an insurer
has a great deal of merit. A bad faith suit allowed recovery not
only for the judgment rendered against the insured, but also emo-
tional distress and even punitive damages. Contrary to the court's
implications, an insured was protected from wrongful conduct by
both the insurer and its attorney. Now, however, the insurer must
incur the expense of two attorneys, dramatically increasing its
costs.
While the decision may be disliked for this reason, a potentially
more damaging result may emerge from Cumis. On its face,
Cumis makes serious inroads into the viability of insurance poli-
cies. Unless the courts restrict the holding in Cumis, an insurance
policy may become worthless. Every claim submitted by an in-
sured to his insurer may have to be litigated in a court to deter-
mine whether a duty to defend exists. Neither the insured nor the
insurer will be able to determine the scope of that duty by looking
to the terms of the policy, as by its holding, the court in Cumis
has implied that such terms no longer are binding. Instead, arbi-
trary decisions from a court will decide the rights and obligations
of the parties. Neither party will be certain of their duties or of
their standing with respect to whether the insured is protected
from a certain risk. The conclusion reached in Cumis thus may
not only have been unwarranted, but also unwise, with respect to
its potentially devastating intrusion into the contractual relations
between insurer and insured.
Peter B. Lightstone*
161. See supra text accompanying notes 100-42.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 143-50.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
* This Note is dedicated to my family, and especially my parents, without whose
love and support I would not have come this far.
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